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The Reality of EU-Conformity Review in France 
Juscelino F. Colares
∗
 
"Il ne peut y avoir égalité devant la loi, s'il n'y a pas unité de la loi."1   
"The operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the 
same State is plainly hostile to the reign of law."2   
French High Courts embraced review of national legislation for conformity with EU law in 
different stages and following distinct approaches to EU law supremacy.  This article tests 
whether adherence to different views on EU law supremacy has resulted in different levels 
of EU directive enforcement by the French High Courts.  After introducing the complex 
French systems of statutory, treaty and constitutional review, this study explains how EU-
conformity review emerged among these systems and provides an empirical analysis 
refuting the anecdotal view that different EU supremacy theories produce substantial 
differences in conformity adjudication outcomes.  These Courts' uniformly high rates of EU 
directive enforcement and similar willingness to refer questions to the ECJ for preliminary 
rulings demonstrate that, despite adopting dissimilar approaches to the supremacy of 
Communitarian law, French judges have flourished as Communitarian law judges.  The 
article concludes by presenting an explanation for this high degree of convergence: French 
judges, responding to growing European integration and enabled by a changing 
constitutional landscape, adjusted their views to ensure they would have a role in molding 
the integration of national and EU law.  (JEL: F 53, K 33, K 41) 
Introduction
† 
Besides establishing the free flow of capital, workers, goods and services among the 
national states forming the nascent European Union,3 Europe's Founding Fathers4 aimed to 
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† The author is grateful to Kevin M. Clermont and Claire M. Germain for their helpful 
suggestions, which greatly assisted his research.  The author's most sincere gratitude and 
appreciation go to the Honorable Guy Canivet and the Honorable Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe 
for irreplaceable training in French and comparative constitutional law.  The author bears sole 
responsibility for any remaining errors.  Ashley Brickles and Melissa Palmer provided excellent 
research assistance.  A prior version of this article was presented at the annual Conference on 
Empirical Legal Studies at the Yale Law School (November 5-6, 2010). 
1 Jean-Marc Sauvé, Vingt ans après . . . l'arrêt Nicolo, in 40.1 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 5-10, at 9 
(2009).  The Honorable Jean-Marc Sauvé is the Chief-Justice (Vice-président) of the Council of 
State.   
2 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (Felix Frankfurter, J. (speaking for the 
majority)). 
3 The EU is the supranational governmental organization, formed currently by 27 European 
national states, of which France, along with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, is a founding member.  Originally formed under the Treaty of Rome (1957) (also 
referred to as the "Treaty Establishing the European Community" since 1993) and named as the 
European Economic Community ("EEC"), it owes its current name to the Treaty on European 
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create a new legal order, premised on the respect for economic, civil and political rights 
administered by a new justice system: a post-national, European one.  Of course, the new 
legal order could only come into existence if individuals—European citizens—were 
governed by the same law wherever they lived, worked or travelled within the bounds of a 
new European space no longer dominated by national borders.5  To promote uniform 
interpretation of this new body of laws, the Treaty of Rome created the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities (the "European Court of Justice" or "ECJ"), the successor to the 
commercially-focused Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
operation since 1951.6   
The ECJ has a broad and varied original jurisdiction.  Not only can it entertain 
challenges to the legality of acts by EU institutions (art. 230), it has jurisdiction over 
actions by the EU Commission against member states for failure to fulfill their obligations 
under the Treaty of Rome (art. 226), and it can review challenges to national institutions' 
failures to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Rome (recours en carence) (art. 232) (on 
grounds such as misuse of power, failure of observing due process, failure to act, etc.).  
Furthermore, the ECJ is competent to give "preliminary rulings" on questions (questions 
                                                                                                                                                 
Union ("TEU" or the "Maastricht Treaty"), signed on February 2, 1992.  Treaty on European 
Union and Final Act. Feb.7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.   
4 The men commonly identified as the European Founding Fathers, largely due to their efforts 
toward early European construction, are Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and Robert 
Schuman.   
5 La Cour de cassation et la construction juridique Européenne—L'office du juge, in C. CASS. 
RAPPORT ANNUEL (2006) 93, 97.   
6 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 
("Treaty of Rome").  The other major supranational European Court, the European Court of 
Human Rights ("ECHR") was created one year earlier under the auspices of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 14, 1950 (the "European Convention of Human Rights" or the 
"Convention").  Because the Convention includes 20 European states outside the 27 EU members 
and this study focuses solely on conflicts between French national law and EU law, ECHR-
related developments will only be discussed when absolutely necessary.  Yet, the traditional 
separation between EU law and the Convention regime deserves some revision in light of the 
December 1, 2009 entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Maastricht Treaty 
by, among other things, referring expressly to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
"Charter"), making it legally binding on all EU members.  See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 
2007 O.J. (C 306) 50 ("Treaty of Lisbon").  Because the Charter expressly proscribes EU 
regulations and directives from contradicting the Convention (the UK and Poland have opted out, 
however), it is also binding on EU members when they are implementing EU law.  See Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 15.  This means 
that the two regimes have now converged into one, with the caveat that the Convention now has 
binding effect on European supranational and national actors as a matter of EU law.  Because the 
Convention also has binding effect on all 27 EU members as a matter of their own foreign 
relations law due to their status as signatories, this convergence sets up interesting jurisdictional 
conflicts as national courts face the possibility of having to choose between potentially different 
interpretations of human rights law between the ECJ and ECHR.   
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préjudicielles) regarding EU law referred to it by national courts or tribunals (art. 234).7  
Specifically, article 234 grants national judges the discretion (lower-level national courts) 
or obligation (national courts of last resort) to refer any nontrivial EU law question 
necessary to the disposition of a case to the ECJ.   
As vast as the ECJ's original jurisdiction is, about half of its caseload is derived 
from its connections with national courts,8 whether through referrals of preliminary 
questions by national courts or challenges to the conformity of decisions by the latter with 
Communitarian (i.e., European Union) law and precedents.9  Yet, these few treaty-
sanctioned linkages between the ECJ and national judges illustrate only superficially the 
very important role national judges have played in construing and developing 
Communitarian law.  Despite the lack of a specific grant of authority in the major European 
treaties, national judges have uniformly interpreted the power of referral to include an 
implicit authorization to act as ordinary judges of Communitarian law.10  Acting to ensure 
uniformity in the application of EU law, national judges and courts have the power to set 
aside domestic law in favor of Communitarian law in disputes before them.11   
This article offers the first systematic study of how the French High Courts—
judicial (Cour de cassation (Cassation)), administrative (Conseil d'État (Council of State)) 
and constitutional (Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council or the Council))—have 
decided disputes regarding the conformity of French national laws to European Union 
("EU") directives.  Under article 249 of the Treaty of Rome, member states are required to 
implement all EU directives by enacting a new statute (i.e., a law of transposition) or by 
utilizing any other "form or method" of regulation that produces the results intended in the 
directives.  Because the scope of a given national law or regulation may at times intersect 
with that of a directive, irrespective of whether such norm is specifically intended to 
transpose a directive, this study investigates not only challenges to the conformity of 
                                                 
7 Two additional supranational judicial institutions have been created to assist the ECJ in its 
multiple tasks and thus operate under its supervision: the Court of First Instance (1988) and the 
Civil Service Tribunal (2004).   
8 See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT (2008) 82  (reporting 
288 referrals of preliminary questions and 210 direct actions (some of which are actions for 
failure to fulfill obligations by national governments) out of a total of 592 new cases filed in the 
ECJ that year).     
9 Following standard parlance, this article uses the terms "EU law" and "Communitarian law" 
interchangeably. 
10 See, e.g., Jean-Guy Huglo, La mission spécifique d'une Cour suprême dans l'application du 
droit communautaire: l'exemple de la Cour de cassation française, in 26 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 
1972 (2000) (describing Cassation's role in the application of EU law in France as deriving from 
its power of referral) (The Honorable Jean-Guy Huglo is a Conseiller réferendaire at the Court of 
Cassation).   
11 See, e.g., Guy Canivet, Avant-Propos, in 26 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 1971 (2000) (The 
Honorable Guy Canivet, writing then as Chief-Justice (Premier président) of the Court of 
Cassation, is currently an Associate-Justice (Membre) of the Constitutional Council); and Sauvé, 
supra note 1at 9.  
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national laws of transposition to directives but also broader conflicts between national 
measures (including regulations and administrative acts) and directives.   
Thus, this study analyzes the extent to which the French High Courts have applied 
domestic law in contemplation of European directives.  In doing so, this article expands on 
the existing literature in two key ways.  First, it attempts to verify empirically whether there 
are any discernable differences among these Courts in how they have decided disputes 
involving conflicts between French law and EU directives (i.e., regardless whether a 
transposing law is involved).  It analyzes the High Courts' decisions from 1989 to 2008 to 
determine whether national adjudicators have taken a pro-Europe or Euroskeptic stance 
based on how deferential each Court has been to EU directives in these conflict cases.  The 
study tests whether any observable difference emerges in the patterns of decisions adopted 
by these Courts.  Second, after detecting a tendency towards convergence in their 
deferential treatment of EU law and ECJ precedent, the article presents an overarching 
rationale for the growing degree of convergence, one largely based on shifting perceptions 
of Europe and its institutions, fostered by continuous constitutional reforms, judicial 
adaptation and growing European judicial comity.   
Part I of this article briefly reviews the legal and political science literature on the 
relationship between national and supranational courts on both sides of the Atlantic and 
ponders whether a focus on supranational courts can accurately reveal the truly 
multidimensional nature of European judicial integration.  After making the case that it 
cannot, the article discusses more recent French scholarship on the subject and illustrates 
its richness by focusing on the role played by the ensemble of the French judiciary.   
In light of (a) this study's inquiry on French national courts' role as European 
adjudicators and (b) the uniqueness of the French judicial system, Part II provides a primer 
on its basic characteristics.  The uniqueness of the French judicial system, it will be 
demonstrated, owes much to France's historic attachment to legislative sovereignty (or the 
theory of the loi-écran, as it is known in France), namely the political-legal doctrine under 
which promulgated statutes (until quite recently) could not be challenged before any court.  
Part II shows that this limitation on the jurisdiction of French courts is one of the major 
reasons for the development of a dual system of review: where a priori constitutional 
review12 operates on parallel with ex post conformity review, the latter of which is the 
focus of this article.13  Part II identifies and explains these review systems as responses to 
                                                 
12 By a priori constitutional review, I refer to the-until-recently sole method of constitutional 
review in France: abstract review.  This method of review remains restricted to certain political 
actors who have standing to file constitutionally-based challenges against approved but yet-to-be 
promulgated bills, thus forming a case that is heard exclusively by the Constitutional Council.  
See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1.  I will discuss the implications of the recent introduction of ex post 
constitutional review later in this article.   
13 By ex post conformity review, I refer solely to court challenges to the conformity of 
promulgated national law (hence ex post) and other government acts with respect to France's 
international engagements.  As will be shown, this form of review, though not expressly 
authorized in the Constitution, has been interpreted by the French High Courts to be essential for 
the effective enforcement of article 55 of their Constitution.  However, as stated in note 6, this 
article focuses only on the subset of conformity review litigation that involves challenges to 
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historic-legal constraints that have deeply affected the manner in which both the Council 
itself and the other High Courts conduct all review in France, thus having a direct impact 
on how French adjudicators apply EU law.   
Following Part II's discussion of the Constitutional Council's development of a 
dichotomous review system, Part III turns to both Cassation's14 and Council of State's15 
initial deployment of conformity review in the Vabre (1975) and Nicolo (1989) decisions.  
These were the pivotal moments where these Courts, after an invitation by the 
Constitutional Council, "found" an implicit authorization under the Constitution to review 
the conformity of a French statute with respect to the Treaty of Rome, thus deploying 
conformity review in France.  Part IV provides a methodology for the development of the 
study's database.  Part V offers a quantitative analysis that shows a high degree of 
convergence among the High Courts in their treatment of national law/EU directive 
conflicts, a convergence that reveals a high degree of deference to EU directives.  The 
implications of a strong convergence and alignment among these courts with respect to 
European supranational jurisprudence are also examined.   
This article concludes by suggesting that the Constitutional Reform of 2008,16 
which expanded the Constitutional Council's jurisdiction to ex post, concrete (i.e., "as-
applied") constitutional review, introduces a number of challenging questions that will 
occupy the minds of French High Court Justices for years to come.  As a newer system of 
constitutional review begins operating side-by-side with a largely overlapping EU law 
conformity review system, which increases the likelihood of jurisdictional disputes, the 
relationship among French Justices and their relationship with the ECJ are likely to face 
new pressures.   
I. Prior Literature on European Judicial Integration 
Despite significant scholarly interest in the United States and Great Britain on 
European integration, American17 and British comparativists and political scientists tend to 
                                                                                                                                                 
existing national laws vis-à-vis EU law.  Thus, conflicts between French law and other European 
law (e.g., the Convention) or international law are outside the scope of this article.   
14 Administration des Douanes v. Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel et Cie. SARL, 
[1975] 2 CMLR 336 (Cass., Ch. mix. 6, May 24, 1975) (Court of Cassation, Combined 
Chambers) (Invalidating an internal consumption tax established by the French Customs Code 
due to its incompatibility with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome and holding that 
Communitarian law, by virtue of article 55 of the Constitution, constitutes "a separate legal order 
integrated with that of the Member states . . . and is binding on their courts."). 
15 Raoul Georges Nicolo and Another, [1990]1 CMLR 173 (Conseil d'Etat, Ass., October 20, 
1989) (Council of State, Assembly) (holding that a national law providing rules for the election of 
representatives to the Assembly of the European Communities was not in conflict with certain 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome, after finding that article 55 of the Constitution implicitly 
authorized the Court to engage in conformity review).   
16 This Reform was approved by the French Parliament on July 21, 2008.  See Constitutional 
Law no. 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on Modernizing the Institutions of the Fifth Republic, n.1. 
17 I use the term "American" to refer to ideas, people and things emanating from the United 
States.  That is the case even when they did not come originally from the United States.   
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC) 
 - 6 - 
examine the relationship between national law and EU law from a supranational 
perspective, often subsuming discussions of national courts' decisions under analyses of 
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") decisions.18  This supranational focus is influenced by 
the tremendous growth of EU judicial and non-judicial institutions and the particular path 
of constitutionalization they pursued—a path paved largely by supranational judicial 
lawmaking and technocrat-driven incremental treaty-making.19   
At first look, it seems reasonable that, as a substantial portion of law-creation 
moves away from individual states to the purview of supranational institutions and actors, 
legal analysis should shift away from a purely state-centric approach.  This shift, however, 
does not require that all analysis of European integration occur only at high levels of 
aggregation.  That would risk ignoring the very rich and illuminating contribution that 
diverse state-based legal institutions have given to this process.  A "bottom-up" study of 
this integration process that takes the French High Courts as a point of departure would 
explain how gradually, over the last fifty-years, these institutions distanced themselves 
from purely state-centric perspectives to embrace the underlying values inspiring the 
creation of the EU.20  Thus, top-bottom, supremacy-infused analyses of EU law and 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., JOSEPH H. WEILER & MARLENE WIND, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
BEYOND THE STATE (2003); Joseph H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 
2403-83 (1991) (both proposing that Europe's constitutional order has emerged from ECJ 
jurisprudence); and MICHELLE EVERSON AND JULIA EISNER, THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION: JUDGES AND LAW BEYOND CONSTITUTIVE POWER (2007) (articulating the view 
that ECJ jurisprudence has driven EU's constitutionalization process, one that dispenses with the 
need for a conventional constituent forms of constitutional drafting).  For illuminating 
comparative work that incorporates both national and supranational judicial perspectives, see 
MITCHEL DE S. -O. -L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS–A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004); and ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH 
JUDGES–CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000).  Similar high levels of aggregation also 
predominate in current U.S.-based research on European human rights law.  Compare YONATAN 
LUPU & ERIK VOETEN, THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF CASE CITATIONS(2010) (concluding that the ECHR uses case law to 
both justify its decisions and develop legal norms), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549947, 
with their French counterparts, Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, 
in D. Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers, eds., INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Ashgate Publishing 1997) (explaining why French courts are less inclined 
to justify their decisions on precedent than courts in common law countries).   
19 See Grainne de Búrca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe's 
Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 555-83, 556-58.  For a 
critique of judicial constitutionalization, see Martin M. Shapiro, Comparative Law and 
Comparative Politics, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 537-42 (1980).   
20 Indeed, other "bottom-up" international law scholars have observed that transnational legal 
orders rely heavily on collaboration among cross-border domestic judicial, administrative and 
legislative networks as well as nonstate actors.  See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press) (2004) (discussing the concept of the disaggregated 
state) and Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational 
New Governance, 42 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (Summer 2009) (arguing that diverse 
combinations of nonstate and state actors often cooperate and, in some instances, even create 
innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business).   
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institutions ought to be complemented by analyses that account for the dynamic and 
complex relationships among national and supranational adjudicators.   
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, most French commentators (i.e., law professors and 
academically-inclined lawyers) adopt the latter approach.  They typically focus on rulings 
by national courts and analyze the evolving status of European law in France, while adding 
commentary on ECJ jurisprudence.21  This scholarship is highly valuable due to its 
enlightening discussion of questions regarding domestic implementation of EU directives 
in full view of supranational processes, but, unfortunately, tends to be available only in 
French.22  Although these studies benefit from approaching EU law from both national and 
supranational perspectives, they often overemphasize punctual friction points (i.e., 
exceptional cases) between the French High Courts and the ECJ and, therefore, fail to give 
due credit to the high level of inter-institutional mutual cooperation in the vast majority of 
their important decisions.23 
Remarkably, a number of judge-written articles have appeared throughout the last 
decade to explain how French judges view the role of EU law.24  These articles might 
arguably be considered an attempt to offset French scholars' tendency to focus on 
exceptional decisions and occasional friction by depicting the relationship between judges 
and EU law and institutions as a far more cooperative venture.  Regardless, to effectively 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Anne Levade, La constitutionnalité des lois de transposition entre conformité et 
compatibilité, 1291-1306 MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE LOUIS FAVOREAU (Dalloz 2007); 
Bertran Mathieu, Le contrôle des lois de transposition des directives communautaires par le 
Conseil constitutionnel ou les difficulties du cartésianisme, 1307-16 MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR 
DE LOUIS FAVOREAU (Dalloz 2007); Florence Chaltiel, Droit constitutionnel et droit 
communautaire–Nouvelle precision sur les rapports entre le droit constitutionnel et le droit 
communautaire–La decision du Conseil constitutionnel du 27 juillet 2006 sur la loi relative aux 
droit d'auteurs, 68 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 837-47 (2006); Bruno 
Genevois, Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit communautaire dérivé–A propos de la decision nº 
2004-496 DC du 10 juin 2004, REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 651-61 (July-
August 2004); and Jacques Arrighi de Casanova, La decision nº 2004-496 DC du 10 juin 2004 et 
la hiérarchie des normes, ACTUALITÉ JURIDIQUE – DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 1534-37 (July 26, 
2004).   
22 But see Marie-Claire Ponthoreau and Frabrice Hourquebie, The French 'Conseil 
Constitutionnel': An Evolving Form of Constitutional Justice, 3.2 THE JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 269 (2008), and Xavier Groussot, EU Law Principles in French Public Law: 
'Un Accueil Réservé,' 0 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (2007). 
23 See note 21.   
24 See, e.g., Jacques Biancarelli et al., Peut-on parler d'un "renouveau européen" du Conseil 
d'Etat depuis 2007,  1-16 (forthcoming in MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE MANIN, 2009) 
(The Honorable Jacques Biancarelli is a Conseiller d'Etat); Sauvé, supra note 1 at 9; Bernard 
Stirn, Le Conseil d'Etat et les jurisdictions communautaires: un demi-siècle de dialogue des 
juges, in 40.2 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 3-7, at 3 (2009) (The Honorable Bernard Stirn is President of 
the Litigation Section of the Council of State); Canivet supra note 11 at 1971; Huglo supra note 
10 at 1972-78; Christophe Soulard, L'application du droit communautaire par la chambre 
criminelle de la Cour de cassation, in id., at 1991-2001 (The Honorable Christophe Soulard is a 
Conseiller réferendaire at the Court of Cassation).   
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change the narrative of French-EU judicial relations from a "war of the judges" to a 
similarly broad "dialogue of the judges,"25 one needs more than anecdotal evidence of such 
cooperation.  One must empirically demonstrate the extent of judicial integration of the EU 
legal order in France by looking at how the French High Courts have applied domestic law 
in contemplation of European directives.  Surely, the ideal balance between wealth of 
information and generalization in studies of European judicial integration could be reached 
by a series of country-specific empirical studies, like the present one, where patterns of 
judicial integration are investigated, and the picture sketched by supranational research 
complemented.  To accomplish this goal, at least with respect to France, one must first 
understand the lay of the judicial landscape, a matter to which I now turn.   
II. The Uniqueness of Review in France and the Constitutional Council 
A. The Nature of Review in France 
To understand how EU-conformity litigation sprung from the Constitutional 
Council's jurisprudence to become a full-fledged review system operated by the Court of 
Cassation and the Council of State, one must first disabuse oneself of the notion that French 
judges engage in "judicial review," as the term is traditionally employed this side of the 
Atlantic.  Clearly, the term cannot be used in countries like France, where ordinary judges 
and courts lack the power to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislated law, whether in 
as-applied or facial challenges.26  In fact, in much of Continental Europe, the task of the 
judiciary has been merely to guarantee the supremacy of parliamentary acts over decrees, 
regulations and administrative acts.  This does not mean that constitutional provisions are 
parameters to be employed solely by legislators as they consider enacting statutes.  Rather, 
it means that only a certain type of court, the constitutional court, has subject-matter 
jurisdiction over constitutional disputes.  In fact, the detachment of constitutional courts 
from the hierarchy of the judiciary (broadly understood)27 mirrors the detachment of 
constitutional law from the hierarchy of infra-constitutional laws, further demonstrating the 
separation between constitutional and infra-constitutional law.  This separate reserve for 
constitutional-order questions also explains why, traditionally, the competence of 
constitutional courts was limited to answering discrete constitutional questions referred to 
them by a very limited number of actors: certain politicians (i.e., the few who until recently 
held the monopoly on standing to trigger constitutional review in France) or High Courts 
(as it has been the case in Spain, Italy and, since 2010, France).  Clearly, such referrals 
from the legislature and the judiciary to national constitutional courts constitute a form of 
abstract constitutional adjudication far removed from the traditional "case or controversy" 
judicial review that takes place in the United States.   
                                                 
25 These expressions have been attributed to Advocate-General Bruno Genevois.  See Stirn, 
supra note 24 at 3.  
26 See Martin J. Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, Introduction: The New Constitutional 
Politics, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 397, 400 (1994).   
27 From now on, I use the terms "judiciary" and "judicial" (and their variations) 
indiscriminately to include all judges in France's two legal orders (judicial and administrative), 
but not the detached Constitutional Council.   
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Indeed, using judicial review to describe the work of judges is even more 
problematic in France, where Jean-Jacques Rousseau's thinking on separation of powers led 
to their subjugation to legislative authority.28  In 1790, the legislature created the 
predecessor to today's Court of Cassation and placed it under its supervision to ensure that 
judges nominated during the Ancien Régime did not interpret the new laws against the 
interests of Revolutionary France.29  Although the Revolutionary period's strong version of 
legislative sovereignty has long been abandoned, legislative supremacy, in its moderate 
versions, greatly influenced the formation of France's bifurcated judiciary and thus remains 
a part of French legal culture.30   
Finally, even the recent constitutional reform, which gave the Constitutional 
Council the authority to displace legislated law deemed constitutionally infirm, placed far 
more restrictions on this form of review than is typically placed on traditional versions of 
judicial review.31  For instance, the Council only hears referrals, so no writ mechanism 
links ordinary citizens with the Council or gives it discretion to choose the cases it reviews.  
Rather, the Council's task is to answer questions prioritaires de constitutionnalité, i.e., 
incidental questions involving constitutional issues in live cases pending before the French 
courts.  Procedurally, the Council only takes jurisdiction over the question presented to it, 
not the entire case.32  These distinctions suggest that, clearly, it is best to use the broader 
term "review" adding to it a more contextually adequate qualifier—as in constitutional 
review versus conformity review, abstract review versus concrete review, or some other 
adjective—rather than falling prey to applying familiar but not necessarily overlapping 
concepts.  With these qualifications in mind, the path is now clear to explain how 
conformity review appeared as a second system of review in France.   
                                                 
28 This subjugation is implicit in Rousseau's belief that "the law is the expression of General 
Will," also inscribed in article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.   
29 See Decree of November August 16-24, 1790, in 1 COLLECTION COMPLÈTE DES LOIS, 
DÉCRETS, ORDONANCES, RÈGLEMENTS, ET AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT, 361 (J. Duvergier, ed., 1824).   
30 It is quite significant that French judges and courts are only briefly mentioned in the French 
Constitution as the "Judiciary Authority," now placed under the supervision of the President.  See 
1958 CONST., art. 64.  Note that the last obstacle to ex post judicial review of all primary 
legislation was finally removed in France in 2008 (review began in 2010).   
31 See Constitutional Law no. 2008-724, supra note 16, article 29 (providing the new text of 
article 61 of the French Constitution).  See also Organic Law No. 2009-1523 of December 10, 
2009 (providing statutory implementation of art. 61-1 of the Constitution); Decree No. 2010-148 
of February 16, 2010 (presidential order implementing the Organic Law and providing the 
procedure to be followed by the Council of State and Cassation) and Constitutional Council 
February 4, 2010 Decision on Internal Rules (Règlement Intérieur) of Procedure for Priority 
Questions of Constitutionality ("PQC"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ 
conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/ 
reglement-interieur-qpc/decision-reglement-interieur-qpc-du-04-fevrier-2010.47904.html. 
32 See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1 (as amended).  The amended Article 61 does increase the 
jurisdiction of the French constitutional court beyond ex ante abstract review into ex post, 
concrete review, but it also gives the Court of Cassation and Council of State the important 
authority to decide which cases are worthy of referral.  See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1.   
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B. The Constitutional Council and the Evolution of Its Jurisdiction  
1. The Early Years 
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) created a new system of government 
in France: one that established presidential primacy over the Parliament.33  Michel Debré, 
de Gaulle's Prime Minister, key political ally and the major drafter of the 1958 
Constitution, summarized this political oxymoron best when he described the Constitution 
"as a 'parliamentary régime' in which the presidency was 'the keystone'."34  Despite the 
decline in Parliament's power, due to the emergence of the presidency, and the introduction 
of constitutional review, promulgated statutes retained their status as the expression of the 
"General Will" and, thus, could not be displaced by either the newly created Constitutional 
Council or France's judiciary.35   
In fact, so unswerving was the framer's adherence to parliamentary sovereignty that 
ex post review was placed outside the purview of the Constitutional Council or of any other 
court in France.  As the logic of the times seemed to dictate, article 61 would not confer on 
the Council any express jurisdiction over fundamental rights—these could be used to strike 
down approved laws that did not conform to constitutional rights.  Rather, article 61 
appeared to circumscribe the scope of Council constitutional review simply to questions 
regarding the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament.36  This meant that Council review 
would be deployed exclusively to ensure that Parliament would not act beyond the confines 
of its article 34 powers, so as not to encroach on the President's constitutional prerogatives.   
Operationally, this lack of jurisdiction over disputes involving the constitutionality 
of promulgated law required that Council review occur during the brief period between 
parliamentary passage of a new bill and presidential promulgation, that is, before a statute 
                                                 
33 See 1958 CONST., arts. 5-19. 
34 ANDREW KNAPP AND VINCENT WRIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE, 59 
(Routledge, 2006).  Michel Debré was Minister of Justice during elaboration of the 1958 
Constitution.  See Jean-Louis Debré, Chief-Justice (Premier président), Constitutional Council, 
Clôture, Closing Address at Colloque du 3 Novembre 2008, 50ème anniversaire du Conseil 
constitutionnel, in LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, 87, 89 (2009) (out-of-series 
volume).   
35 See 1958 CONST., art. 61 (as amended).  In fact, a proposal giving Cassation and the 
Council of State the power to refer to the Constitutional Council questions regarding the 
constitutionality of statutes in concrete cases was rejected by the original framers largely on 
grounds that it would introduce a "government of judges," revealing the strong mistrust of the 
judiciary among the French political classes, both left and right.  See TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 
DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, AVIS ET DÉBATS DU COMITÉ CONSULTATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONNEL (Documentation Française, 1960), 75-80, 101-02, 164-65.  This mistrust is 
best illustrated by article 64 of the Constitution, which, instead of treating the judiciary separately 
as a branch of the state, calls it "judicial authority," thus reducing its designation merely to the 
task it performs.   
36 The Constitutional Council also had (and it still has) original jurisdiction over disputes 
regarding the regularity of presidential elections and observance of the internal rules of the two 
Chambers of Parliament.  See 1958 CONST., art. 61.  This jurisdiction of the Council is not 
relevant to the discussion in this article.   
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was finally "on the books."  In other words, review was necessarily a priori and, thus, 
abstract in nature.37  Furthermore, to foreclose the Council from ever displacing 
parliamentary majorities' choices where the President's political interests were in no way 
threatened, the drafters reserved the right to refer laws to the Council to only a few major 
political actors: the President of the Republic, the Prime-Minister and the Presidents of 
both Chambers of Parliament.38  Clearly, this design vastly maximized institutional stability 
at the cost of suppressing minority opposition and citizen input.  It also meant that the 
Constitutional Council was not born a full-blown constitutional court, rather it was 
expected to perform the role of a quasi-judicial appendage of Parliament, thus allowing the 
consolidation of presidential powers in the first years of the Fifth Republic.39  As expected, 
there were few referrals during this early period, none of which included a constitutional 
question of great political salience.40  The Council's limited constitutional jurisdiction, no 
doubt part and parcel of an institutional design meant to further the role of the presidency 
in the French political and constitutional order, would undergo major transformations in the 
1970s.   
2. The Birth of Positive Constitutional Review 
Few decisions are as transformative to a legal order—and surely to the reviewing 
body that announces them—as those establishing entirely novel competencies.  France's 
"Marbury41 moment" came with the Constitutional Council's Liberté d'Association ruling.42  
The July 16, 1971 decision resulted from a referral by Alain Poher, the President of the 
Senate and former candidate for the presidency in 1968.43  Mr. Poher triggered the events 
by referring a challenge to the constitutionality of a National Assembly-approved bill 
meant to give certain superior officers in the national administration (i.e., préfets) the right 
                                                 
37 See 1958 CONST., art. 61.   
38 See id.  
39 See SWEET, supra note 18 at 41.   
40 Only 45 constitutional challenges were referred to the Council between 1958 and 1971.  
See Louis Favoreu & Loïc Philip, LES GRANDES DÉCISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 937, 
937-38 (2007) (14th ed. Dalloz).   
41 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Cranch) (holding that a judge's oath to uphold 
the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause implicitly authorize courts to review and strike down 
Acts of Congress deemed contrary to the Constitution). 
42 Liberté d'Association, 71-44 DC, REC. 29, RJC I-24 (July 16, 1971) (considérant 2) 
(declaring "in the name of the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic and 
solemnly reaffirmed by the Preamble of the [1958] Constitution," which also references the 
preamble of the 1946 Constitution and the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, that a constitutional right of free association exists, according to which all associations 
shall be constituted and governed by the sole will of their members) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis-
1958/decisions-par-date/1971/71-44-dc/decision-n-71-44-dc-du-16-juillet-1971.7217.html.   
43 See Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 22 at 276.   
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to refuse credentialing civil organizations deemed to threaten the integrity of the French 
state and the public order.44   
From the Council's perspective, considering the merits of this referral marked, by 
itself, a significant shift: it meant transcending the typically negative nature of its 
encroachment review of Parliament into the potentially rights-creating, hence positive, 
review of the content of a particular fundamental right.  The Council found this authority in 
the "fundamental principles recognized under the laws of the Republic and solemnly 
reaffirmed in the Preamble" of the 1958 Constitution,45 the latter containing references to 
numerous sources of fundamental rights, such as the Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789 
and the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution.46  Given the political and institutional stakes 
involved, the Council's holding in Liberté d'Association—invalidating portions of the bill 
due to violations of the right of free association—while significant, was far less 
consequential than its decision to incorporate sources of substantive economic and social 
rights into the bloc de constitutionnalité, against which all future bills would be evaluated.  
For in promoting such incorporation, the Council effectively opened the gates to positive 
constitutional adjudication.   
Yet, opening the gates would not amount to much without a steady flow of 
referrals.  During the early years, their volume and relevance remained severely 
constrained due to rules that bestowed on few political actors the standing to initiate such 
review.  Certainly, it did not help that these actors until then had belonged to the same 
center-right/right majority, to whom making frequent referrals would be counterproductive.  
The Constitutional Reform of 1974 relaxed standing requirements and, thus, gave a further 
boost to the Council's newfound constitutional powers.  Cognizant of his narrow electoral 
victory in the 1974 presidential election and seeking to create safeguards against a future 
leftist government, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing successfully proposed a 
constitutional amendment extending to any combination of 60 Deputies or 60 Senators the 
right to refer legislation to the Council.47  By giving minority coalitions, i.e., the 
opposition, the right to trigger constitutional review of bills, the amended article 61 
provided the caseload the Council needed to perform its new mission as a positive 
constitutional adjudicator.  In fact, adding the opposition to the roster of referring 
authorities caused an explosion in the number of referrals: in contrast with 51 referrals in 
its first 15 years (1958-73), the Council entertained a total of 221 referrals in the following 
15 years (1974-89), a more than fourfold increase (i.e., 423%) in the Council's 
constitutional docket.48   
C. The Strange Birth of Conformity Review in France  
Just as the growth in the Council's constitutional activity was about to take off, at a 
time when its members and the political class had not yet become accustomed to the idea 
                                                 
44 See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 238 n. 2.   
45 See Liberté d'association, REC. 29 (considérant 2.).    
46 See 1958 CONST., Preamble.   
47 See Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 22 at 276-77.   
48 See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 937-54.   
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that parliamentary bills can be overridden by positive constitutional adjudicators, the 
Council entertained a case that would profoundly affect the manner in which all French 
judges would approach the relationship between national law and France's international 
commitments.  On December 20, 1974 a splinter group of majority coalition Deputies, 
dissatisfied with a government-sponsored bill that allowed abortions prior to the tenth week 
of the gestational period in situations of "mother distress," relied on the recently amended 
article 61 to challenge the bill's constitutionality and international conformity.49  Reviewing 
the bill strictly as a referral under article 61, the Council declared that the challenged 
provision did not violate the individual freedom (i.e., liberté) "enunciated in article 2 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,"50 and thus held the bill as 
constitutional.51  However, when pressed to determine whether the national legislation 
conformed to the European Convention of Human Rights, the Council deferred.  The 
Council reasoned that, by virtue of the "difference in the nature of these two reviews,"52 
i.e., constitutional review (pursuant to art. 61) and conformity review (pursuant to article 
5553), "it lacked competence, once seized under article 61, to evaluate the conformity of a 
[national] law with the provisions of a treaty or an international agreement," the latter an 
attribution of article 55.54   
By adopting this interpretation, the Council abdicated from conducting review of 
legislation for compliance with France's international commitments.  This occurred at a 
moment when the process of European integration was accelerating.  In hindsight, the 
Council's decision to pass on conformity review seems remarkable and unwise.  French 
scholars have written volumes criticizing IVG,55 some even pondering how the Council 
could abandon it.56  While addressing these criticisms would require going beyond the 
scope of this study, suffice it to say that, logistically, the Council was not prepared then 
(and, in my view, is still not prepared now) to be confronted with one more expansion on 
its jurisction given the compressed timeframe under which it operates (30 days).57  Still, the 
                                                 
49 See id. at 298.  Remarkably, French legal historians have told this author that, since the 
1974 Reform, this remains the only instance in which the majority has referred a bill to the 
Council.   
50 See Interruption volontaire de grossesse, 74-54 DC, REC. 19, RJC I-30 (January 15, 1975) 
(considérant 8) ("IVG"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis-1958/decisions-par-date/1975/74-54-dc/decision-n-
74-54-dc-du-15-janvier-1975.7423.html.   
51 See IVG, REC. 19 (Article premier).   
52 See Id.  (considérant 6).   
53 Article 55 provides: "Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon 
publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to 
its application by the other party."  1958 CONST.   
54 See IVG, REC. 19 (considérant 7).   
55 For a sample of these studies, see Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 291.   
56 Guy Carcassone & Bruno Genevois, Faut-il maintenir la jurisprudence issue de la décision 
n°74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975?, 7 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 95 (1999).   
57 See 1958 CONST., art. 61.   
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bigger story here lies elsewhere, for, despite the Council's narrow construction of its article 
61 jurisdiction, conformity review did not go without effective judicial supervision in 
France.   
III. The Emergence of Conformity Review: Enter Cassation and Council of State 
Conformity review emerged in France in three stages: first, barely four months after 
IVG, at Cassation; second, fifteen years later, at a reluctant Council of State; and, finally, at 
the Constitutional Council, in 2004, and this only after a constitutional amendment 
expressly incorporated EU law into domestic law.58  Such incorporation prompted the 
Council to engage in a new, quite narrow form of conformity review, still subsumed under 
its traditional abstract constitutional review.59  While somewhat confusing, this staggered 
adoption of conformity review reflects the High Courts' perceptions of their roles and 
capabilities, as well as their differing views on European integration overtime, which has 
also contributed to their being perceived as varying in their commitment to European 
judicial integration.60  After a brief description of the evolution of this new form of review 
in these Courts, this article will turn to an analysis of the empirical validity of such 
perceptions and other hypotheses.   
A. Cassation's Embrace of Conformity Review 
Soon after IVG, Cassation entertained an appeal from a decision by the Appellate 
Court of Paris that had invalidated a French consumption tax (article 265 of the French 
Customs Code) due to its incompatibility with article 95 of the Treaty of Rome.61  
Remarkably, Advocate General (Procureur Général) Touffait urged Cassation to 
embrace conformity review and maintain the decision to strike down the French statute 
solely on Treaty of Rome grounds.  The idea behind basing this decision on this sole 
independent legal ground was to establish that the supremacy of EU law in France rested 
not merely on French constitutional law (i.e., article 55 of the Constitution, hence the 
provenance of the Council), but on EU law itself (i.e., the Treaty of Rome as construed 
                                                 
58 The constitutional reform of 1992, which allowed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, 
altered article 88 of the Constitution by giving EU law a specific constitutional status in French 
law.  The amended article 88-I reads: "The Republic shall participate in the European 
Communities and in the [EU] constituted by States which have freely chosen by virtue of the 
treaties which established them to exercise some of their powers in common."  1958 CONST.   
59 See Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, 2004-496 DC (June 10, 2004) 
(considérant 7) (declaring that "the transposition of a Community directive into domestic law is a 
constitutional requirement" and that, as such, laws of transposition are subject to review) 
("Economie numérique"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2004/2004-496-
dc/decision-n-2004-496-dc-du-10-juin-2004.901.html.   
60 For a rare commentary in English illustrating the conventional wisdom regarding the 
different approaches the Council of State and Cassation have adopted with respect to EU law, see 
Groussot, supra note 22 at 35-36. 
61 Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre, Cass., Ch. Mixte, D. 1974, 159 (May 24, 1975) 
("Vabre").   
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by the ECJ,62 the provenance of French judges as ordinary judges of Communitarian 
law).  To Touffait, the principle that EU law applies in France as a result of its 
concurrent, yet independent, sovereignty with the Constitution derived from the fact that 
"the transfer of power made by the Member States from their internal legal orders in 
favor of the legal order of the Community" had operated a "definitive limitation of their 
sovereign rights."63  In sum, EU law was binding regardless of its status in French law.   
Despite prior ECJ rulings on Communitarian law's supremacy and self-executing 
status,64 to make such a proposition to Cassation at that time might have seemed radical if 
one considers the history of legislative supremacy in France.  However, in light of France's 
obligation to bring its laws into conformity with Communitarian law and the Constitutional 
Council's major abdication of conformity jurisdiction in IVG, it was necessary to fill that 
void.  Indeed, the Advocate General expressly recognized the need for conformity review 
of French statutes by stating that "from the position taken by the Council, one can thus 
conclude that it falls on the courts before which this problem has been presented, and it 
inheres to them alone, under penalty of denial of justice, the task of addressing it."65  
Cassation accepted the invitation and became the first French High Court to strike down a 
national statute (not merely a bill) for incompatibility with the Treaty of Rome.  Yet, while 
recognizing that the Treaty of Rome had created a "separate legal order," the Justices at 
Cassation still referred to article 55's treaty supremacy clause as concurrent authority.66   
B. Council of State's Delayed Embrace of Conformity Review 
The uninitiated in French judicial history will find it quite remarkable that the 
Council of State would only take up conformity review in 1989, fifteen years after 
Cassation's Vabre decision.  Holding to the tradition that the administrative judge is not 
to review the validity of legislation, the Council of State refused to take this step even as 
other notoriously recalcitrant national courts in Europe—the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (1971) and the Italian Constitutional Court (1984)—had finally 
accepted setting aside domestic statutes contrary to Communitarian law.67  However, the 
                                                 
62 See infra note 64. 
63 Id. (Opinion of the Advocate General) 
64 Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that "the transfer by the states from 
their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising 
under the Treaty [of Rome] carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against 
which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot 
prevail.") ("Costa"); Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337(holding that, just 
as regulations, directives "are directly applicable and, consequently, may by their very nature 
have direct effects," in Member states' national legal orders.) ("Van Duyn"). 
65 Vabre (Opinion of the Advocate General).  
66 See id. (Judgment of the Court).   
67 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 9, 1971, 31 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 145 (F.R.G.) (holding that ordinary 
"German courts must also apply legal provisions which, though attributable to an autonomous 
sovereign power outside the State, do nevertheless on the basis of their interpretation by the [ECJ] 
develop direct effect within the State and override and displace contrary national law."); S.p.a. 
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case for change would become yet more compelling in 1988, when the Constitutional 
Council itself, exercising its sole "as applied" jurisdiction as France's electoral Supreme 
Court (article 59), held that a French statute (the Act of July 11, 1986) conformed with 
Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby engaging in 
conformity review.68  All these developments left the Council of State no other option but 
to break with tradition.   
The opportunity for change presented itself in a challenge to the conduct of 
European Parliament elections by two French voters, Messrs. Nicolo and Roujansky.69  
Specifically, the plaintiffs contested the participation of French citizens from the overseas 
departments in the election of representatives to the European Parliament based on an 
interpretation of a French statute (the Act of July 7, 1977) that would bring it into conflict 
with article 19 of the Treaty of Rome.  Patrick Frydman, a mid-level officer in the 
Council of State (Maître de requettes), appearing as Solicitor in the case (Commissaire 
du Gouvernement),70 called the Justices to uphold the Treaty of Rome over subsequent 
national law on the theory that article 55's supremacy language "necessarily enable[d] the 
courts, by implication, to review the compatibility of statutes with treaties."71  Frydman 
reasoned that article 55 "establish[ed] a system of priority for different rules," and thus 
was "addressed primarily to the courts." 72  He assured the Justices that, in giving the 
Treaty precedence over later statutes, they would not abolish legislative supremacy 
completely, for such review "relate[s] only to reviewing compatibility of statutes with 
treaties." 73  Thus, Frydman's argument for conformity review was premised on a 
different supremacy rationale: unlike Touffait's concurrent supremacy theory, his was an 
argument for upholding the Treaty of Rome as a matter of French (constitutional) law.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Corte costituzionale, 8 jun. 1984, n.170, 
Guir. It., I, 1521 (holding that "conflicting provisions in a national statute cannot constitute an 
obstacle to the recognition of the binding force conferred by the Treaty [of Rome] on Community 
regulations as a source of directly applicable rules."). 
68 See Assemblée nationale, Val-d'Oise (5ème circ.), CC decision no. 88-1082/1117, Oct. 21, 
1988.   
69 See Raoul Georges Nicolo, Council of State, Ass., R.F.D.A. 1989, 813 (Oct. 20, 1989) 
("Nicolo"). 
70 Since February 2009, the official designation for the post of Solicitor at the Council of 
State has changed from Commissaire du Gouvernement to Rapporteur public.  See Décret n° 
2009-14 du 7 janvier 2009 relatif au rapporteur public des juridictions administratives et au 
déroulement de l'audience devant ces juridictions, JORF n°0006 du 8 janvier 2009 page 479, 
texte n° 8, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020046644&dateTexte=
&categorieLien=id.   
71 Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813 (Opinion of the Solicitor).   
72 Id.  This rationale for conformity review closely tracks Justice Marshall's Supremacy-
Clause-inspired rationale for judicial review.  See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178-79. 
73 Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813 (Opinion of the Solicitor).   
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Seeking to end its isolation in Europe and among the French Courts, the Council 
of State seized upon this opportunity and embraced conformity review by holding that the 
French electoral statute did not violate the Treaty; doing so, however, pursuant to the 
authority deemed implicit under article 55.74  With legislative supremacy now a part of 
the past—at least with respect to treaty-law—the Court positioned itself to shape 
Communitarian law and, thus, participate in a process that had been in operation for more 
than three decades.  Viewed in this perspective, Nicolo was as revolutionary as it was 
reactive.  It was part of a phenomenon taking place throughout Europe, where national 
courts, operating under the growing pressure of ECJ and ECHR precedent, sought to 
secure a role in the evolution of European law so as to, in the words of Frydman, "break 
their monopoly."75   
C. Conformity Review Resurfaces in the Constitutional Council 
Facing similar external and internal pressures, but lacking "as applied" authority 
(except on electoral law) per IVG, the Constitutional Council's ability to participate in the 
interpretation of European law in France was quite restricted.  In fact, the adoption of 
conformity review by the other French High Courts might have delayed the arrival of 
concrete (i.e., ex post) constitutional review in France, the other method through which 
the Council could potentially influence the interpretation of French law vis-à-vis France's 
European commitments.  In fact, as Cassation and the Council of State grew accustomed 
to reviewing the compatibility of French statutes with European law, which itself had 
been incorporating fundamental rights through ECJ and ECHR adjudication (which often 
targeted national laws), a form of de facto, "as applied" constitutional review came into 
existence in France.76  For instance, in the year 2001 alone, the Council of State 
entertained over 2,000 challenges to the conformity of domestic measures to the 
European Convention of Human Rights.77   
Still, in the realm of abstract (i.e., ex ante) constitutional review, the Council had 
some room to maneuver to become a relevant player in interpreting EU law in France.  
Yet, doing so without reversing IVG—and thereby incurring the heavy administrative 
burdens that it had originally sought to avoid—was the challenge.  The Council would 
finally accomplish this feat in 2004, by embracing a nuanced (not surprisingly) version of 
conformity review, engineered through a measured withdrawal from IVG's extreme 
position.78  A group of opposition Deputies and Senators referred a bill that, among other 
things, transposed an EU directive (No. 2000/31/CE, July 8, 2000) and regulated several 
                                                 
74 See Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813. 
75 Id. (Opinion of the Solicitor).   
76 For a discussion on the growing constitutional nature of ECJ and ECHR review through 
fundamental rights adjudication, see SWEET, supra note 18.   
77 OLIVIER DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND CONVENTIONAL 
REVIEW 1, 9 (2008) (The Honorable Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, writing then as an Associate-
Justice (Membre) of the Constitutional Council, has recently retired after serving two terms in the 
Court).  The reader is reminded that review pursuant to the Convention is outside the scope of this 
article.   
78 See Economie numérique. 
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aspects of electronic commerce and messaging.  They challenged that, as written, the bill 
violated the constitutionally protected rights of privacy and individual freedom of 
communication (article 34).79  Article 88-I—the product of the 1992 constitutional reform 
that ratified the Treaty on European Union—had promoted the incorporation of EU law 
in the French legal order.  In it, the Council found a specific, novel constitutional 
authorization for reviewing the conformity of transposing laws to directives, on the 
theory that the obligation to "transpos[e] . . . results from a constitutional requirement."80  
Accordingly, the Council announced it would now engage in conformity review, even 
when seized under article 61, a clear departure from IVG.  Only this time, article 88-I's 
specific bestowal of supremacy on EU law would provide the rationale, not article 55, as 
that path remains foreclosed by the portion of IVG that still governs.81   
The Council was extremely careful in establishing the scope of this nascent 
review.  Specifically, by construing its role under article 88-I as solely that of a guardian 
of the constitutional obligation to transpose, the Council ensured that it would only 
exercise review over one type of national norm: laws of transposition.  This meant that 
bills not expressly designed to accomplish transposition, yet somehow conflicting with 
existing directives, would not be reviewed.  Under the Council's narrow interpretation, 
the nonconformity of a law, other than a law of transposition, was not a violation of 
article 88-I's constitutional requirement of transposition.  Yet, as Parliament enacts 
several laws every year, which may overlap with existing directives, deciding to skip 
review of laws not of transposition, while not an oversight, is a significant abdication of 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, the Council also declined jurisdiction to consider referrals 
challenging legislative provisions that do no more than transpose the "direct, necessary 
and precise" effects of a directive,82 apparently on the belief that the routine job of 
assuring that national measures give direct effect to secondary Communitarian law falls 
on ordinary French judges in their role as Communitarian law judges.83  Thus, the 
Council limited the scope of its own conformity review to (i) ruling on the conformity of 
bills expressly designated as laws of transposition; and, as to this particular type of bill, 
(ii) examining nontrivial questions pertaining to their constitutional duty to transpose.   
Yet, even as the Council recognized transposition as a constitutional obligation, it 
made another important reservation: transposing bills that violate "express constitutional 
provisions,"84 or principles "inherent to the constitutional identity of France,"85 would be 
                                                 
79 See id. (considérants 4 & 6). 
80 Id. (considérant 7) (emphasis added). 
81 Compare IVG, REC. 19 (considérants 2 & 7) with Economie numérique (considérant 7).   
82 Economie numérique (considérant 9). 
83 Pierre Mazeaud, L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL SUR 
LES LOIS DE TRANSPOSITION DES DIRECTIVES, L'ADMINISTRATION FRANÇAISE ET L'UNION  
EUROPÉENNE: QUELLES INFLUENCES? QUELLES STRATÉGIES, rapport public du Conseil d'Etat 
398-99 (2007) (The Honorable Pierre Mazeaud, writing then as Chief-Justice of the 
Constitutional Council), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/pdf/Conseil/20061215.pdf.   
84 Economie numérique (considérant 7). 
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invalidated.86  This meant that it placed secondary Communitarian law under the French 
Constitution, thereby underscoring the constitutional character of the Council's 
conformity review.  In announcing this new version of conformity qua constitutional 
review, the Council managed to rebalance its powers to optimize several aspects of its 
role as a constitutional court in a changing European legal landscape.  First, by reviewing 
only the most complicated questions regarding interpretation of laws of transposition, it 
did not greatly disturb the balance of power among French courts.  Second, in narrowing 
the scope of review to such laws, it protected the twin policy aims of IVG, namely (i) 
focusing on its role as a constitutional reviewer; and (ii) controlling its docket in light of 
the time constraints under which it operates.  Finally, in directly engaging with EU law, 
the Council furthered the process of EU legal integration, although it remained 
anachronistically beholden to the view that EU law owes its supremacy to its foundations 
in France's constitutional order.   
That national courts would retain such views, even as the ECJ had long declared 
the (unconditional) supremacy and direct effects of EU law, is not surprising.87  Other 
European national Courts had done the same.88  Indeed, the adoption of such parochial 
conceptions of EU law supremacy is the result of historical judicial turf wars (la guerre 
des juges), with national courts reacting and adapting to the decline of national law as EU 
integration proceeds and the influence of ECJ jurisprudence grows.  These "wars" are 
also responsive to another dynamic: the institutional rivalry among national High Courts.  
In this sense, the ready acceptance of conformity review by Cassation and its late, 
begrudging, adoption by the Council of State and the Constitutional Council are the result 
of a multi-causal, highly interactive process.  Regardless of one's beliefs as to the relative 
contribution of external and internal factors to the emergence of conformity review in 
France, it seems clear that, among the three High Courts, Cassation was the only one to 
embrace a concurrent theory of EU law supremacy in France.  Both the Council of State 
(article 55) and the Constitutional Council (article 88-I) firmly grounded their duty to 
ensure conformity solely on French Constitutional grounds.  This article now attempts to 
empirically verify whether these Courts' different views on the status of Communitarian 
law result in different levels of directive enforcement in France.   
                                                                                                                                                 
85 See Loi relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information, 
2004-540 DC (July 27, 2006) (considérant 19).   
86 Chief-Justice Mazeaud suggested France's republican attachment to secularism (laïcité) is 
inherent to the constitutional identity of France.  See Mazeaud, supra note 83 at 398-99. 
87 See, e.g., Costa, E.C.R. 585 and Case 92/78, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. 
Simmenthal Spa, 1978 E.C.R. 629 (holding that Community law, from its entry into force, 
"renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of . . . national law," and "that it is 
not necessary for . . . [national] courts to request or await the actual setting aside by the national 
[legislative or executive] authorities . . . [so as not to] impede the direct and immediate 
application of Community rules.") ("Simmenthal II").   
88 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 37 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 27 (F.R.G.) (Internationale 
Handelsgesellshaft MBH v. Einfuhr- Und Vurratsstelle Für Getreide Und Futtermittel) ("Solange 
I") (Germany); Corte costituzionale, 21 apr. 1989, n.232 ("Fragd") (Italy); STC, Dec. 13, 2004 
(No. 1) (Spain).   
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IV. Data Description and Methodology  
To test whether distinct theories of EU law supremacy lead to different levels of 
directive enforcement, I looked at quantifiable aspects of "directive cases" entertained by 
these parallel adjudicatory systems.  These quantifiable aspects ranged from establishing 
the obvious, such as determining whether a directive was enforced, to coding for more 
intricate variables, such as the type of national measure invoked (e.g., law of 
transposition, etc.), the case's subject matter, the reasons for non-enforcement of a 
directive (e.g., out of scope, procedural impediments, etc), whether the referral of a 
preliminary question to the ECJ was requested or granted, the status of the litigants (e.g., 
private party or government), etc.  I coded for these other variables to detect whether 
differences in directive enforcement, if any, might be related to differences in these 
Courts' dockets (mainly Cassation and Council of State),89 rather than differences in their 
stated views on EU law supremacy.  For instance, a substantial portion of Cassation's 
civil and commercial docket involves private litigation.  This can never occur in litigation 
before the Council of State, France's Supreme Administrative Court, where the 
government is invariably a litigant.90  In sum, coding for litigant status allowed me to 
compare private party vs. government litigation (or vice-versa) in both Courts to ensure 
that any difference that I might detect on the treatment of directives is not attributable to 
differences in the type of litigants appearing before them.   
A. Defining a Directive Case 
So far, I have used the term "directive challenges" to describe conformity cases 
before France's three High Courts.  In reality, I looked at more than just challenges 
involving the conformity of national law to directives.  I looked at all cases where a 
litigant or a court, sua sponte, invoked both directives and national law in some manner.  
Specifically, the point was to cover (i) direct conformity challenges of the type "directive 
says X, national measure says Y (i.e., where Y somehow contradicts X), therefore enforce 
X," (think intersecting circles in a Venn Diagram); (ii) claims for parallel enforcement, as 
in "both directive and national measure say X, therefore enforce X" (think concentric 
circles in a Venn Diagram); and (iii) situations where, depending on how the Court rules 
on scope, "X displaces Y (or vice-versa)" (think separate, non-overlapping circles in a 
Venn Diagram).  This broad definition avoids under-inclusiveness, reduces complex 
boundary issues (but does not eliminate them completely as I discuss later) and ensures 
that the entire universe of directive conformity review is captured regardless of the 
argument made or final determination reached.   
B. Data and Methods 
1. Period of Study 
                                                 
89 The focus on Cassation and the Council of State in this empirical section owes to the fact 
that the Constitutional Council has entertained only 8 conformity review referrals since its June 
10, 2004 Economie numérique decision.  See infra note 94.  
90 For the reasons adduced in Parts II and III.C, the government is also always a litigant 
before the Constitutional Council.   
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I collected data covering completed results of conformity review in the period 
from October 20, 1989 to December 31, 2008.  The reader will recall the initial date as 
the day the Council of State announced its Nicolo decision.  That choice owes to the fact 
that any comparison between the two French Courts that have handled the bulk of 
conformity review cases (i.e., Cassation and Council of State) should begin only on or 
after the second has embraced conformity review.  Indeed, going back to 1975 would 
produce uninteresting results: the Council of State would unequivocally and unfairly 
appear as Europhobic merely due to its initial fourteen-year reluctance to overcome 
legislative supremacy and review national laws. 
2. The Data 
The three main sources of primary data were (1) the LamyLine Reflex database, a 
French commercial subscription service containing French High Court reported 
decisions; (2) the Legifrance Website, a government-funded legal Website; and (3) the 
Websites and Intranet databases of Cassation,91 Council of State92 and Constitutional 
Council.93  The combined use of these databases allowed me to focus my search on 
directive cases, as described above, and ensured that, through different research queries, I 
captured the entire population of directive cases adjudicated in these Courts.   
3. Assembling and Coding Cases 
To avoid double-counting in situations where either Cassation or Council of State, 
in considering a case, referred a prejudicial question pertaining to the interpretation of a 
directive to the ECJ, I made sure that only the final Court decision, i.e., after ECJ input, 
counted as a case, despite being assigned a different decision number (i.e., arrêt and 
pourvoi, in Cassation and Council of State, respectively).  Obviously, the ultimate 
variable of interest in this study is each Court's level of directive enforcement, which I 
calculated from the universe of directive cases they entertained.  A directive is enforced 
any time a party (or Court) invokes its application and the Court either expressly or 
implicitly relies on it as it announces its decision.  Because of the formulaic, non-
narrative style of French opinion writing, I had to check the final holdings of some 
especially difficult implicit-enforcement cases against the opinions of either Advocate 
General (Cassation) or Solicitor (Council of State) to finally ascertain whether a directive 
was enforced or not.  I also used this procedure to clear up questions with respect to the 
other variables of interest in the study.   
V. Results and Analysis 
As hypothesized earlier, should the conventional wisdom on how the French High 
Courts approach EU law be correct, one would observe different rates of directive 
                                                 
91 I thank Isabelle Goanvic, Councilor (Conseiller référandaire) and Assistant Director of the 
Documentation Section at Cassation for helping me with research on the Court's Intranet.   
92 I thank Jacques Biancarelli, Councilor (Conseiller d'Etat) in charge of European Law at the 
Council of State for his research advice and for allowing me to use the Court's Intranet.   
93 I thank Lionel Brau, Director of the Library and Information Services Section at the 
Constitutional Council and Guy Cleret, Librarian, for their invaluable research assistance during 
my clerkship at the Council.   
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enforcement among them.  Of course, the dearth of directive cases in the Constitutional 
Council (8 cases), due to its late embrace of conformity review and restrictive standing 
requirements, would not allow robust confirmation or refutation of the received view.  
Indeed, in all such cases, the Constitutional Council enforced the directive.94  Table I 
presents the number of directive cases heard by the three High Courts.  The greater 
number of Council of State and Cassation decisions explains why, from this point 
forward, my analysis focuses solely on the conformity cases they entertained.  All tables 
and background information on statistical tests conducted are presented in the Appendix.   
TABLE I: FRENCH HIGH COURTS' EU CONFORMITY REVIEW CASELOAD (1989-2008) 
Court Number of Cases 
Constitutional Council (2004-08) 8 
Council of State 465 
Court of Cassation 462 
  
 
A. Do Cassation's and Council of State's Different Views on EU Law 
Affect the Likelihood of Directive Enforcement?  
A comparison of Cassation and Council of State directive enforcement rates (see 
Table A) reveals that, among Cassation's 462 cases, directives were enforced 88 percent 
of the time (407 cases), while 12 percent (55 cases) resulted in non-enforcement.  
Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the same: rounded 
enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 88 percent and 12 percent, respectively.  These 
results show not only that the French Courts share a high rate of directive enforcement, 
but also that varying the reviewing Court has no impact on the likelihood of enforcement.   
To discard the possibility that very small observed differences in raw percentages 
could still produce a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT 
and RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test.  I obtained a p 
value that far exceeded .05 (two-tailed), and thus could not corroborate the conventional 
wisdom hypothesis that Council of State review is less likely to enforce directives than 
Cassation review.  That the source of review has no impact on the rate of directive 
enforcement indicates that differences in these Courts' approach to EU law have not 
played a role in whether directives are effectively enforced.  This major finding negates 
the anecdotal, no doubt historically influenced (see Part III), divergence theory.   
                                                 
94 See Loi relative aux organismes génétiquement modifiés, Decision No. 08-564DC, June 6, 
2008; Loi relative au secteur de l'énergie, Decision no. 543-06DC, Nov. 30, 2006; Loi relative au 
droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information Decision no. 546-06DC, July 
27, 2006; Loi pour l'égalité des chances, Decision no. 535-06DC, Mar. 30, 2006; Loi relative à la 
protection des personnes physiques à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel, 
Decision no. 499-04DC, July 29, 2004; Loi relative à la bioéthique, Decision no. 498-04DC, July 
29, 2004; Loi relative aux communications électroniques et aux services de communication 
audiovisuelle, Decision no. 497-04DC, July 1, 2004; Economie numérique, supra note 59.   
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC) 
 - 23 - 
B. Effect of Differences in Cassation's and Council of State's Dockets 
1. Accounting for Litigant-Based Differences Between Cassation 
and Council of State 
In refuting the conventional wisdom, this study's major finding of similar rates of 
directive enforcement must be checked against the possibility that, by aggregating all 
cases each court handled, it ignored docket differences that might reveal how different 
attitudes toward EU law supremacy impact the rate of enforcement.  For instance, a critic 
could object that such an aggregate comparison does not account for the fact that civil 
and commercial cases, much of which is private litigation, make up about 68 percent of 
Cassation's docket, whereas all litigation before the Council of State involves the 
government.95  To account for this fact, I examined only private-to-government litigation 
in Cassation's docket and compared it to the Council of State's docket.   
a. Initial Results 
At first look, a comparison of the Courts' directive enforcement rates in private-
to-government litigation does produce different results (see Table B1a).  The reduction in 
Cassation's volume of adjudication pushes the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT up to 
about 95 percent (277 cases), which, compared to the 88 percent observed in the Council 
of State, supports the conventional wisdom.  Moreover, a p value of .002 corroborates the 
hypothesis of a relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE OF DIRECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT.  This result casts a shadow of doubt over the earlier finding of no 
relationship reached by considering all cases.  Therefore, I decided to investigate further 
to detect if some cause other than these Courts' different views regarding EU law 
supremacy might be responsible for this shift.  I began by looking at the reasons for non-
enforcement.   
b. A More Nuanced Look at Litigant-Based Differences: 
Enter the Out-of-Scope Justification 
i. Finding Some Theoretical Hints 
In a study of ECHR decisions, James Sweeney argues that national courts' 
preferred justification for refusing to apply the Convention is to hold certain situations as 
factually falling outside the scope of the Convention or ECHR jurisprudence, even when 
a Convention provision is on point.96  Sweeney theorizes that, in recognition of the 
Contracting Parties' "diverse political cultural backgrounds and traditions,"97 the ECHR 
                                                 
95 I obtained this percentage by averaging Cassation's volume of civil and commercial cases 
as a proportion of total cases for 2006 and 2008, which I chose at random.  See C. CASS. 
RAPPORT ANNUEL (2008) pt. 5, at 371; id. (2006) pt. 5, at 475.  Criminal prosecutions are the 
other category of cases in its docket.  In such cases, the state is represented by independent 
prosecuting magistrates (i.e., ministère public or parquet) who "supervise the preliminary police 
investigations" and ensure the proper exercise of the state power to prosecute and restrict the 
liberty rights of the accused.  See KNAPP & WRIGHT, supra note 34 at 397.   
96 James Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 462 (2005). 
97 Id. at 463.   
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tolerates this practice and affords domestic courts some measure of discretion so that 
"they can balance for themselves conflicting public goods" in areas implicating major 
domestic public policy.98   
A similar version of this "margin of appreciation" argument appears in Xavier 
Groussot's analysis of the relationship between EU law and French public law.  Groussot 
argues that, unlike Cassation, which does not hesitate to apply "general principles of 
Community law to obligations resulting [purely] from internal law," the French 
"administrative courts generally refuse to apply the general principles in purely internal 
matters."99  He explains that, in the Council of State's view, general principles of EU law 
"only apply in the national legal order when the situation falls within the scope of 
Community law."100  As an illustration, he suggests and cites to recent opinions where the 
Council of State only applied the general EU law principle of legitimate expectations in 
situations coming squarely within the subject matter of a particular directive.101   
This makes sense, for administrative review in France has traditionally had a 
narrow focus, due to administrative judges' restrictive views of their role as mere 
adjudicators of the legality of administrative acts for excès de pouvoir (i.e., ultra vires 
review under strict objective legality).102  Clearly, French administrative judges are not at 
all comfortable with the indefinite, loose-form method of review that is required to give 
effect to the more subjective legitimate expectations principle.  Groussot believes that 
unease with this "far too indefinite"103 Communitarian law principle is behind the 
Council of State's insistence on "a clear dichotomy between . . . internal law and matters 
falling within the scope of Community law."104  If Groussot is right, the Council of 
State's resistance to conducting a broader form of review might explain its lower rate of 
directive enforcement.  More importantly, that would renew doubts as to the validity of 
the conventional wisdom: for if differences in the Council of State's and Cassation's own 
margins of appreciation explain their different rates of directive enforcement in private-
to-government adjudication, then adherence to different supremacy theories cannot take 
all the credit.   
ii. Adjusting Litigant-Based Equalization for 
Margin of Appreciation Differences 
To account for this "margin of appreciation effect," I eliminated all non-
enforcement decisions premised on out-of-scope justifications from both Cassation and 
                                                 
98 Id. at 462.  Lupu and Voetten make a similar point in THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AT THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF CASE CITATIONS at 5-6, supra 
note 18.   
99 Groussot, supra note 22 at 35. 
100 Id. at 39. 
101 See id. at 39-40 and accompanying note 163. 
102 See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203-04 (4th ed. 
1993).   
103 Groussot, supra note 22 at 40. 
104 Id.  at 39. 
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Council of State datasets.  This is justified because adherence to different scope-of-
review theories will affect whether and how often a Court refuses to enforce a directive 
on out-of-scope grounds.  Also, a Court's refusal to enforce a directive on out-of-scope 
grounds is not technically a decision that national law trumps the directive, but a 
statement that the directive simply cannot apply to a particular factual situation presented 
in the case.  Thus, removing out-of-scope cases from the dataset should provide a better 
comparison between these two Courts when one considers the litigation involving the 
same types of litigants (i.e., private parties and government).  Furthermore, removing out-
of-scope decisions seems justified in light of the broad approach I took when assembling 
both "directive case" databases (see discussion in Part IV.A above).  Because I included 
all cases where a litigant invoked both directives and national measures in some manner, 
I may have included cases where the connection between directives and national 
measures is remote at best.  Therefore, removing out-of-scope cases should improve the 
quality of the data while at the same time addressing the potential effect of non-
supremacy-motivated differences in margins of appreciation.   
Comparing the Courts' directive enforcement rates in private-to-government 
litigation without the out-of-scope cases in the data produced a remarkable result: the 
equalization of litigant composition in Cassation and Council of State adjudication no 
longer has any impact on the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT.  That is, the Courts' 
enforcement rates are now virtually the same (see Table B1b).  The new comparison 
shows that, among Cassation's 286 "private party vs. government cases," directives were 
enforced 97 percent of the time (277 cases), while only 3 percent (9 cases) resulted in 
non-enforcement.  Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the 
same: rounded enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 96 percent (407 cases) and 4 
percent (15 cases), respectively.  To check if these slight differences in raw percentages 
amount to a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE 
OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test.  Statistical testing (p 
value approximately .835, two-tailed) refuted this hypothesis.  Clearly, adjusting the 
litigant-equalization table (Table B1a) for traditional scope-of-review differences 
between the two Courts (Table B1b) reveals that ADJUDICATING COURT has no impact on 
RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT.   
Again, this result discredits the anecdotal perception of a difference between the 
two Courts grounded on their different views on EU law supremacy.  While one could 
hypothesize that the Council of State's EU law supremacy views might themselves 
influence its more restrictive approach to the scope of administrative review, it can hardly 
be denied that it adopts the same approach throughout its non-European jurisprudence.  
History clearly shows that is the case.  Simply put, the supremacy argument explains too 
much.  Thus, after careful reflection, once differences in the status of litigants before 
these Courts are accounted for, one still cannot confirm the conventional view.   
2. Accounting for Differences in Domestic Laws Invoked Before 
Cassation and Council of State  
A closer look at the kinds of national measures (e.g., laws of transposition, 
decrees, regulations, acts, etc.) invoked in directive cases before the two Courts reveals a 
much lower frequency of adjudication involving laws of transposition before the Council 
of State.  After excluding out-of-scope litigation for the reasons discussed in the prior 
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section, I found that while Cassation entertained 156 cases involving laws of 
transposition, the Council of State entertained only 40 such cases (see Table B2a).  
Because conformity review involves the possibility of setting aside different kinds of 
national measures contrary to EU directives, and because the Council of State has seen 
adjudication involving laws of transposition much less frequently, one might question the 
appropriateness of comparing the two Courts' dockets, never mind reaching conclusions 
that refute received views.   
Before addressing this question empirically, it is important to realize why this 
objection is not dispositive on theoretical grounds.  The Council of State, in its concurrent 
consultative, non-judicial capacity as advisor to the Parliament and government, analyzes 
every piece of legislation proposed by the latter for conformity with French laws and 
international commitments.105  In this consultative role, it conducts a formal prescreening 
of every bill thus submitted, including proposed laws of transposition.  This separate 
reviewing process tends to eliminate flagrantly violating laws,106 which likely reduces the 
number of transposing laws that will trigger future litigation.  This might explain why, in 
its "judicial" capacity, the Council of State entertains conformity challenges to laws of 
transposition less frequently than Cassation, which has no consultative and hence no 
prescreening role.107 
Still, to respond to this challenge empirically, I segregated conformity 
adjudication before these Courts into two tables: one considering solely law-of-
transposition cases (see Table B2a), the other considering challenges to all other national 
measures (see Table B2b).  Looking solely at law-of-transposition adjudication, I found 
that Cassation enforced directives 97 percent of the time (152 cases), while the Council 
of State did so a bit less frequently, in approximately 93 percent of the cases (37 cases) 
(see Table B2a).  To check if this slight difference is statistically significant, I conducted 
a Fisher's exact test and obtained a p value that exceeded .05 (two-tailed).  Therefore, 
there is no statistical difference in the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between 
Cassation and the Council of State when conformity cases involving laws of transposition 
are considered alone.  In sum, whether adjudicating private rights (droit subjectifs) 
(Cassation) or the legality of administrative acts (legalité) (Council of State), when 
considering the conformity of laws of transposition to directives (conformité objective), 
each Court is just as likely to enforce directives as the other.   
Next, I checked directive enforcement rates in adjudication involving all other 
types of laws (Table B2b).  The elimination of law-of-transposition cases from both 
dockets appeared to strengthen the case for convergence between the two Courts.  In 
Cassation, the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT was about 96 percent (255 cases), 
which, compared to the 97 percent (370 cases) rate observed in the Council of State, 
                                                 
105 See 1958 CONST., art. 39 and BROWN & BELL, supra note 102 at 61-62.   
106 I say "tends to" because the government can still submit a bill that does not conform to 
"the modifications suggested by the Conseil d'Etat."  Id. at 61.   
107 Note that the decrease in the number of transposing laws likely to be adjudicated before 
the Council of State says nothing about the strength of as-applied challenges to the promulgated 
versions of such laws.  I discuss the broader case selection issue in the next subsection.   
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would suggest that the latter Court is slightly more likely to enforce directives in such 
cases.  However, a p value of .666 (two-tailed) shows that the effect of ADJUDICATING 
COURT on RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT is but the result of random chance and, 
thus, cannot be corroborated.  This result, again, shows that the Courts have converging 
high rates of directive enforcement, despite adhering to different theories of EU law 
supremacy.  More broadly, differences in the volume and types of laws they review are 
not significant barriers to comparing how they adjudicate cases.   
3. Case Selection 
Because, under the conventional view, the Council of State is perceived as less 
deferential to EU law, one may question whether private parties file challenges only 
when EU directives clearly trump national law, thus accounting for the Council of State's 
high enforcement rate.  Indeed, if fewer challenges to national laws mean only stronger 
cases are being pursued at the Council of State, the lack of difference in the RATE OF 
DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between the two High Courts could be a result of case 
selection,108 rather than an indication of similar deference to EU law.  Arguments for the 
existence of a selection effect in the context of Council of State review fail for at least 
two reasons.  First, Council of State adjudication is only concerned with cases involving 
individual or collective organizations resisting some kind of administrative action.  The 
perception of less deference to EU law alone is unlikely to keep these litigants from 
seeking redress through the administrative courts when they know they are not likely to 
get any meaningful relief unless they sue.109  Simply put, the existence of "might have 
been" plaintiffs is inconsequential in this context.  Second, private litigants realize that 
having the Council of State hear their conformity challenges places them in very 
favorable position since, pursuant to Treaty of Rome article 234, national courts of last 
resort are required to refer nontrivial questions regarding EU law interpretation to the 
ECJ.  This implies that, by the time Council of State review occurs, every strong (i.e., 
trivial) case for either type of litigant has already been disposed of, meaning that, if 
anything, Council of State review is much more likely to involve "harder" cases, the 
opposite of case selection.  Thus, the conventional view is not likely affecting litigants' 
decisions to file conformity challenges in the administrative courts or appeals to the 
Council of State.   
C. Reconciling the Reality and Perception of EU-Conformity Review 
                                                 
108 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1984). 
109 In stark contrast to administrative adjudication, the state may appear before Cassation in a 
different posture.  In civil cases, it often appears as a common tort litigant, i.e., as a sujet des 
droits, as if it were a private party having no general claim to sovereign immunity (unlike the 
state under the U.S. common law system).  See Stanwood R. Duval, Sovereign Immunity, 
Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1471, 1476-77 (2010).  
However, selection is also unlikely in Cassation's civil cases, where there are alternative means of 
relief other than litigation, because stronger cases are more likely to be settled or dismissed 
earlier, leaving only the "harder" cases to final adjudication.  Obviously, selection does not occur 
if private litigants perceive Cassation as a more EU-deferential Court.   
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Without question, Cassation's Vabre (1975) and Council of State's Nicolo (1989) 
announced not only that French "judicial" Courts would review French statutes for 
conformity with EU law, but created, based on each Court's different justification for 
doing so (see Part III.A & B), the perception that one (Cassation) would be more 
deferential to the EU legal order than the other (Council of State).  At first look, the 
formation of such a perception in the past appears reasonable.  Indeed, expressly 
accepting enforcement of EU law as concurrent authority and as soon as the opportunity 
presented itself (Cassation) is quite different from doing so 15 years later, and only as a 
matter of national constitutional law (Council of State).   
Yet, Cassation's early advance into conformity review occurred largely because 
most of its docket involves civil and commercial litigation (about 70 percent),110 making 
it less likely to implicate, and thus potentially displace, major public policy choices 
embedded in domestic mandatory law (droit public), the domain of Council of State 
adjudication.  Certainly, legislative sovereignty had a different weight to the two Courts.  
Moreover, as far as conformity is concerned, the Council of State remained a player on 
EU law conformity discussions even during the 1975-89 period, when, in its consultative 
capacity, it could affect the lawmaking process.  Still, these differences merely explain 
why the Council of State waited 15 years longer than Cassation.  They cannot explain 
why or how, once embracing conformity review, even if under a different theory of EU 
law supremacy, the Council of State, in its judicial capacity, would behave any different 
than Cassation.  After all, once they accepted to conduct conformity review, they both 
had to act as courts of law in the task of ensuring conformity, which, by its name, 
mandates deference to supranational law.  Thus, whether the Treaty of Rome had created 
a "separate legal order" having concurrent authority (Vabre) or controlled only by virtue 
of article 55's treaty supremacy clause (Nicolo), EU directives were to be enforced, 
period.  That the evidence of convergence demonstrates that Cassation and the Council of 
State have acted alike, despite their different foundational views, should not be a surprise.  
Rather, the lack of empirical studies on conformity and the literature's focus on the few 
instances of non-enforcement111 might explain the persistence of anecdotal perceptions.  
1. What Can and Cannot Be Learned from Each Court's Record 
of ECJ Referrals 
An alternative, more straight-forward way of detecting differences in the way the 
two Courts approach EU law might be to check whether they differ in their compliance to 
article 234's (Treaty of Rome) obligation to refer EU law questions to the ECJ.  Clearly, 
if one Court uses the referral procedure much more often than the other, one could 
surmise that it does so because it is more willing to perform the role of ordinary judge of 
Communitarian law than the other.  Arguably, more frequent referrals by one Court 
would imply that its judges are not only more willing to apply but are also more 
concerned with uniform application of EU law than judges in the other.  Such deference 
is normally what one would expect from ordinary judges of Communitarian law vis-à-vis 
their supreme court, the ECJ.   
                                                 
110 See discussion in Part V.B1 and note 95 supra.   
111 Table C1a provides a list detailing the stated reasons for non-enforcement in conformity 
adjudication before both Courts.   
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To contextualize this comparison, however, one needs to understand how French 
courts compare with courts of other EU members.  Despite a late start in conformity 
review by the Council of State, among all EU members, France ranks third (755 referrals) 
in the cumulative number of referrals (i.e., 1952-2008) to the ECJ.  Only Germany (1672 
referrals) and Italy (978 referrals) rank higher.112  Counting solely referrals by the two 
Courts (lower courts can also refer questions under article 234), Cassation, with a 15-year 
head start, has referred questions 83 times while the Council of State has done so on 42 
occasions.  However, if one takes 1989 as the base year, the total number of referrals up 
to 2008 is 46 for Cassation and, obviously, 42 for the Council of State.113  The numbers 
are again very similar, but, of course, not all these referrals presented questions regarding 
secondary EU law, the focus of this study.   
While coding for "directive cases" in the French High Courts, I also took note of 
their respective number of referrals.  Due to the Constitutional Council's extremely brief 
deliberation period (30 days), they obviously cannot wait for an ECJ answer, so they have 
referred no questions.  Conversely, Cassation and the Council of State, as ordinary 
Community law courts, do not operate under such constraints and have referred 14 and 
12 questions regarding the interpretation of directives to the ECJ, respectively.  Figure I 
reveals an alternating, yet balanced, pattern of referrals during the period of study.   
FIGURE I: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE'S ECJ REFERRALS IN DIRECTIVE CASES 
(BIANNUALLY) 
 
 
Once more, the data demonstrate great convergence among the two Courts.  Not 
only are Cassation and Council of State close in their absolute number of referrals in 
directive cases, their relative percentages of directive-case referrals as a proportion of 
                                                 
112 See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT (2008) 104-05.  
113 Compare id. at 104 with SYNOPSIS OF THE WORK OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1988 AND 1989 AND FORMAL 
SITTINGS IN 1988 AND 1989, 41 (1990). 
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total referrals are also nearly identical, at 30 percent and 29 percent, respectively.  A 
difference-of-proportions test demonstrates that this difference is not statistically 
significant (calculated p value of .89 > .05 (two-tailed)).   
Next, I investigated whether the Courts differed in the way they referred cases to 
the ECJ.  Specifically, I looked at how often litigants and Courts, sua sponte, had been 
the original sponsor of referrals (see Table C1b).  Plausibly, a greater frequency of sua 
sponte referrals might demonstrate a greater willingness to engage with the ECJ, thus 
revealing a stronger recognition of the latter's supremacy in declaring EU law.  Although 
the small number of referral cases invites caution when considering these results, I found 
that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Council of State had a greater proportion 
of sua sponte referrals (67 percent or 8 cases) than Cassation (29 percent or 4 cases).  
However, this difference is not statistically significant (p value approximately .113, two-
tailed), indicating that the Council of State is not more likely to refer, on its own volition, 
a directive case to the ECJ than Cassation.   
Finally, I looked solely at litigant-initiated requests for ECJ referrals to investigate 
whether the Courts differed in their reactions to such requests (see Table C1c).  Similar to 
the argument made in the previous paragraph, a Court's greater receptiveness to referral 
requests may well reveal its greater willingness to accept ECJ's input, an implicit 
recognition of the latter's role in spelling out supreme EU law.  While the need for 
caution with the small numbers here still applies, I found that Cassation granted referral 
requests more than twice as often as the Council of State (69 percent compared to 33 
percent, respectively).  This difference, however, was not statistically significant (p value 
approximately .193, two-tailed), an indication that Cassation is no more receptive to this 
type of request than the Council of State.  In sum, while in raw numbers, the Council of 
State seems more likely to refer cases on its own volition than Cassation, with the latter 
Court, in turn, being more likely to grant such requests when instigated by parties in 
litigation, neither of these relationships are statistically significant.  On balance, these 
differences as to how referrals are channeled through to the ECJ are statistically 
meaningless and, even if significant, would at most offset each other.  Thus, the data on 
referrals reveals what other tests in this study have already shown: the impossibility of 
distinguishing these Courts in their roles as ordinary courts of Communitarian law.   
2. A Look at the Forest: Convergence in Annual Enforcement 
Rates 
After determining these Courts share high cumulative rates of directive 
enforcement—and even similar patterns of ECJ referrals—I examined whether their 
respective rates fluctuated over time (i.e., 1989-2008).  Indeed, the use of percentages 
based on aggregate data could hide periods of wide fluctuation in the treatment of 
directive cases between the two Courts.  Conversely, narrow fluctuations would tend to 
indicate uniform application of Communitarian law by France's bifurcated judiciary.  
Table II shows that, throughout the period of study, the Courts have steadily achieved 
high rates of directive enforcement, with the last seven-year period showing a slight 
downward trend in their enforcement rates.  The division of the study into three roughly 
identical periods (of 7, 6 and 7 years) is, however, arbitrary and can be a bit deceptive 
since it ignores year-to-year fluctuations that, while not disrupting general trends, would 
require some explanation.   
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 TABLE II: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE RATES OF 
DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THREE PERIODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To monitor eventual fluctuations and possibly identify their reasons, Figure II 
breaks down, biannually, the Courts' enforcement rates (excluding out-of-scope 
dismissals).  A caveat is in order: one should approach year-to-year fluctuations in the 
enforcement rate with a bit of care for such fluctuations might be themselves the result of 
another spurious fluctuation: the much lower number of cases considered in a given year.  
With this caveat in mind, the first two years show an initial separation between 
Cassation's (90 percent) and Council of State's (100 percent) enforcement rates.  This 
divergence, however, is nothing but the result of a single non-enforcement decision by 
Cassation in 1989, a year in which it considered but one directive case.115  A period of 
converging, high enforcement rates then ensued and lasted until the end of 2000.   
FIGURE II: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE RATES OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT  
(BIANNUALLY) 
         
                                                 
114 I excluded out-of-scope dismissals from the pool of directive cases due to the Council of 
State's more restrictive approach to the scope of administrative review.  See discussion in Part 
V.B.1.b.ii. 
115 See Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Apr. 25, 1989 Bull. 
civ., No. 626 (Robert Willot Co., LLC v. Director General of Taxes) (rejecting appeal on grounds 
that plaintiff's directive argument had been raised in an untimely fashion).   
Court 1989 -1995 1996 - 2001 2002 - 2008 
Cassation 98% 
(57) 
 
100% 
(199) 
92% 
(165) 
Council of State 100% 
(46) 
97% 
(186) 
95% 
(189) 
Note: Number in Parentheses corresponds to total number of cases, excluding out-of-
scope dismissals.114   
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Council of State enforcement rates would drop to 83 percent in 2001 (10 of 12 
cases) and 80 percent in 2002 (8 of 10 cases), while Cassation rates remained at 100 
percent during the same period.  The Council of State justified two of these non-
enforcement decisions on seemingly appropriate grounds: political question116 and prior 
tacit approval by EU officials of the French national measure at issue.117  Yet, strikingly, 
on the other two decisions,118 the administrative Court ruled against enforcement on 
grounds that the directive in question had not yet been transposed into a French national 
measure.  Certainly, conditioning application of a directive on its domestic transposition 
constitutes a denial of EU law supremacy and direct effect.119  Arguably, although 
reliance on this particular non-enforcement ground has occurred only four times (see 
Table C1a)120 in 422 rulings (see Table B1b), this might explain the persistence of the 
perception that the Council of State is less likely to enforce directives, thus distorting its 
overwhelming record of faithfully applying Communitarian law.121   
Following this brief divergence, Council of State and Cassation directive 
enforcement rates enter another period of convergence that lasts through 2007.  Suddenly, 
Cassation's rate drops from 95 percent at the end of 2007 (19 of 20 cases) to 76 percent 
(16 of 21 cases) in 2008 (this drop, alone, explains the drop in the biannual period).  In a 
set of actions for restitution of unduly paid taxes, plaintiffs argued that a provision of the 
French tax code (article 406 A of the Code général des impôts) violated certain EU 
directives (No. 1992/12/CE, Feb. 1992 and 1992/83/CE, Oct. 19, 1992) that exempted 
their productive activities from taxation.122  They alleged the State's failure to timely 
                                                 
116 Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] May 11, 2001 Rec. Lebon (L'Association pour le 
Respect du Site du Mont-Blanc). 
117 Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Oct. 11, 2001 Rec. Lebon (France Nature 
Environment). 
118 Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Jun. 14, 2002, Rec. Lebon. ( L'Association pour la 
Protection de L'Environnement du Val de Copponex); and Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] 
Dec. 30, 2002 (La Federation Nationale Des Transports Force Ouvriere UNCP). 
119 See Costa 1964 E.C.R. 585; Van Duyn 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Simmenthal II 1978 E.C.R. 629. 
120 See CE Jun. 14, 2002( L'Association pour la Protection de L'Environnement du Val de 
Copponex); CE Dec. 30, 2002 (La Federation Nationale Des Transports Force Ouvriere UNCP); 
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Apr. 07, 2006 Rec. Lebon (Societe Phytoservice); and 
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Nov. 05, 2003 Rec. Lebon (le Syndicat de Defense de 
Promotion des Fabricants et Affineurs du Morbier).   
121 Indeed, another empirical study has stated that individuals "tend to overestimate the 
frequency of memorable . . . events" and they may persist in "incorrect judgments in the face of 
inconsistent new information."  Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
Consitutional Tort Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641, 694 n. 217 (1987) (citation omitted).   
122 Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ. 
No. 839 (Boiron Co. v. Director General of Customs & Interregional Director of Customs for 
Rhone-Alpes-Auvergne); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Jul. 
08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 838 (Director General of Customs & Regional Director of Customs for 
Picardie v. Yves-Saint-Laurent Parfums Lassigny); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et 
financière [Cass. com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 837 (Boiron Co. v. Director General of 
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implement the directive had forced them to pay the undue tax for which they sought 
restitution.  Without examining the merits, Cassation rejected these five appeals on 
grounds that this was a matter for the administrative courts, not the judicial courts, and 
thus did not enforce the directive as requested.  However, in refusing to enforce, 
Cassation did not assume a position of antagonism regarding EU law supremacy.  It 
merely paid deference to the distribution of judicial business in France, which reserves 
"to the competence of the administrative courts the quashing or rectification of decisions 
. . . by authorities exercising executive power . . .."123   
The preceding empirical and qualitative analysis shows that one can still make 
sense of longstanding perceptions of Cassation's and Council of State's relationship with 
EU law while refuting anecdotal impressions that such differing perceptions actually 
produce substantial differences in these Courts' decisions.  Despite their different views 
on the relationship between EU law and national law, the data show that, during the 
period of study, they have acted as bona fide Communitarian law judges, enforcing 
directives at an overwhelmingly high rate, and referring questions pertaining to the 
interpretation of directives to the ECJ with similar enthusiasm.  This does not mean that 
the two Courts' views have completely merged, however.  Following the fault lines of the 
French bifurcated judiciary, the Courts will occasionally respond differently to the 
external influence of EU law.  However, it is crucial to understand that occasional 
different responses are not necessarily reactions to or against EU law, but the result of a 
much more complex dynamic.   
Conclusion 
Conformity (and conventional) review emerged in France as a solution to a 
profound impasse: ensuring compliance of national measures to France's growing 
international obligations—a constitutional requirement—while holding on to the notion 
that legislated law could not be called into question—a historical, political, even 
metaconstitutional principle.  France's complex system of constitutional, judicial, and 
administrative "courts" gradually overcame this impasse in creative and different ways, 
often prodded by changes in the national and supranational legal landscape.  In this process, 
the French High Courts took their cues from each other and from their supranational 
counterparts, participating in what came to be characterized as a dialogue des juges.  This 
article investigated a number of contexts in which this judicial dialogue has taken place and 
demonstrated that Cassation and the Council of State, the two supreme courts that held the 
monopoly of as-applied review until quite recently, flourished as Communitarian law 
judges once they embraced conformity review.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Customs, Judicial Agent of Tresor); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. 
com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 842 (Diffusion of Perfume Products v. Director General of 
Customs, Interregional Director of Customs for Rouen);  Cour de cassation Chambre commercial 
et financière [Cass. com.] Oct. 07, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 976(Yves Rocher Biology Labs v. Regional 
Director of Customs and British Indirects). 
123 Loi transférant à la juridiction judiciaire le contentieux des décisions du Conseil de la 
concurrence, 1986-224 (Jan. 23, 1987) (considérant 15).   
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Not unlike the incremental, treaty-based approach to the creation of the Union, this 
process of judicial bricolage had unintended consequences.  The most profound of these 
was the de facto death of legislative supremacy, as Cassation and the Council of State 
enforced directives, at times displacing non-conforming national statutes, an impossibility 
under France's Constitution.  Due to a growing number of Cassation and Council of State 
referrals to the ECJ, the fate of French statutes, some involving constitutional-order 
questions, has been increasingly determined in terms of EU law in Luxembourg.  While 
both the creation of as-applied constitutional review (July 2008) and the Constitutional 
Council's announcement of its first such decisions (May 2010) have "creat[ed] a link 
between the Council and the citizen,"124 they can also be perceived as France's attempt at 
monopolizing the determination of constitutional-order questions.  This shift, besides 
finally sealing the fate of legislative supremacy in France, is but the latest in a series of 
moves by national courts to "catch up" with the pace of European developments and the 
advance of the supranational courts.   
Yet, this re-launch of constitutional review as a parallel review system will 
introduce a number of challenging "Erie-like" questions that will occupy the minds of 
French High Court Justices for years to come.125  For instance, what happens when, in a 
challenge against national law, litigants call for invalidation simultaneously on "serious" 
constitutional (article 61-1) and Communitarian (Treaty of Rome, article 234) law grounds?  
Should Cassation and Council of State Justices refer questions to the Constitutional Council 
and ECJ simultaneously?  What to do if the answers are inconsistent?  Furthermore, should 
the Constitutional Council, in its role as guardian of the constitutional obligation to 
transpose (see Part V.C), refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of a law of 
transposition that merely gives direct effect to a directive and thus defer to the ECJ 
referral?  Clearly, the side-by-side operation of as-applied review and the largely 
overlapping conformity review system will likely increase jurisdictional disputes, as all 
French High Courts play the dual role of national and Communitarian law judges.  
Ultimately, their decision on these choice-of-law issues will affect not only the rate of 
directive enforcement but how European judicial integration occurs in the years to come.  
 
                                                 
124 See Debré, supra note 34 at 19. 
125 Procedurally, the Council's ex post constitutional review of parliamentary acts takes the 
form of answers to preliminary questions (questions prioritaires) involving constitutional issues 
in concrete cases pending before the French judiciary.  Constitutional Law no. 2008-724 of July 
23, 2008 Modernizing the Institutions of the Fifth Republic, article 29 (providing the new text of 
article 61 of the French Constitution).  The amended Article 61 does increase the jurisdiction of 
the French constitutional court beyond abstract review into concrete, "as-applied" review, but it 
also gives Cassation and the Council of State the important authority to decide which cases are 
worthy of referral.  See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1 (as amended).   
 
APPENDIX 
French High Courts' Treatment of Directives under EU Conformity Review 
I.  Introduction and Methodology 
This appendix presents results in two formats: (a) tables containing observed data, 
and (b) inferential statistical analysis.  As far as the body of this article is concerned, 
tables are interpreted or read row-by-row from left to right.  Thus, as I allow the 
independent variable to vary (e.g., Court in Table A), I can detect whether and how the 
dependent variable categories, displayed in each row, change based on their observed 
frequencies.  Of course, to make the information in each cell comparable, each cell's 
absolute frequency is normalized by dividing it by its column total.   
TABLE A: CONFORMITY REVIEW:  FRENCH NATIONAL LAWS VS. EU DIRECTIVES 
(INCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES) 
  Court  
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive 
Enforced 
            407    88.10%          407    87.53% 814 Treatment 
of EU 
Directives   Directive Not 
Enforced 
             55       11.90%           58    12.47% 113 
 Total 462 465   n = 927 
This is, however, a non-statistical method of evaluating the merits of research 
hypotheses.  Given the format in which my data is organized, I use Fisher's Exact Test to 
determine the existence of a relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables.126  This test also compares data from two dichotomous groups—Cassation and 
Council of State—to see whether their different impact on the two categories of the 
dependent variable is statistically significant.  Once I calculate a p value, I compare it 
with the level of statistical significance, which is 0.05 in this study (two-tailed).  If the 
calculated p value is less than this predetermined level, the null hypothesis is refuted and 
the research hypothesis is corroborated.  The following table summarizes these steps. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 Because this test has no formal test statistic or critical value, I derive my conclusions on 
statistical significance by comparing calculated probability values, not by comparing calculated 
and critical values.  This test has the added advantage of giving exact rather than approximate p 
values.   
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC) 
 - 36 - 
FISHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE A 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
407 407  
55 58 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.841   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    significance) 
     
Because the calculated p value (0.841) is greater than the prespecified level of statistical 
significance, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship.  This means that 
varying the Court has no effect on the treatment of directives.   
In cases where I confirm the null, I conduct a post-hoc power analysis to assess 
whether Fisher's had a fair chance of rejecting the null.  I use a 10 percentage point 
difference as the effect size, meaning that, given these populations (I am not using 
samples), I would have a chance of not less than (1-β) of detecting a 10 percentage point 
difference between one of the observed proportions and a theoretical proportion assumed 
to be 10 percentage points smaller.127  The following table summarizes the power test 
(two-tailed, α = 0.05). 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE A 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.8810  Power (1-β) = 0.9822 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.7810  Actual α = 0.04568 
Populations 1 & 2 = (462, 465)   
  
These results show that, given these population sizes, I have about a 98 percent chance of 
detecting a difference of 10 or more percentage points in these Courts' rates of directive 
enforcement.  Excepting Table C1a, which has more than four cells, and Table B1a, 
which refutes the null hypothesis, the remaining tables underwent a similar analysis.   
 
 
 
                                                 
127 See generally Franz Faul et al., Statistical Power Analyses Using G*Power 3.1: Tests for 
Correlation and Regression Analyses, 41 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1149 (2009).  
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II.  Results and Statistical Comparison for Remaining Tables in Text 
TABLE B1a: PRIVATE PARTY VS. GOVERNMENT CONFORMITY LITIGATION 
(INCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES) 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive 
Enforced 
            277    94.54%          407    87.53% 684 Treatment 
of EU 
Directives   Directive Not 
Enforced 
             16       5.46%           58    12.47% 74 
 Total 293 465   n = 758 
 
 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1a 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
277 407  
16 58 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.002   <     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    
significance) 
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TABLE B1b: PRIVATE PARTY VS. GOVERNMENT CONFORMITY LITIGATION 
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES) 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive 
Enforced 
            277    96.85%          407    96.45% 684 Treatment 
of EU 
Directives Directive Not 
Enforced 
             9       3.15%           15    03.55% 24 
 Total 286 422   n = 708 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1b 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
277 407  
16 58 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.835   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    
significance) 
 
 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1b 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.9685  Power (1-β) = 0.9988 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.8685  Actual α = 0.0440 
Populations 1 & 2 = (286, 422)   
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TABLE B2a: LAWS OF TRANSPOSITION AND DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES) 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive 
Enforced 
            152        97.44%        37     92.50% 189 Treatment 
of EU 
Directive Directive Not 
Enforced 
             4        02.56%         3     07.50% 7 
 Total 156 40   n = 196 
 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2a 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
152 37  
4 3 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.152   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    significance) 
 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2a 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.9744  Power (1-β) = 0.6436 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.8744  Actual α = 0.0350 
Populations 1 & 2 = (156, 40)   
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TABLE B2b: LAWS NOT OF TRANSPOSITION AND DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES) 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive 
Enforced 
            255        96.23%        370     96.86% 625 Treatment 
of EU 
Directive Directive Not 
Enforced 
             10        03.77%         12     03.14% 22 
 Total 265 382   n = 647 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2b 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
255 370  
10 12 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.666   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    significance) 
 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2b 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.9623  Power (1-β) = 0.9950 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.8623  Actual α = 0.0435 
Populations 1 & 2 = (265, 382)   
  
 
 
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC) 
 - 41 - 
TABLE C1a: NON-ENFORCEMENT CASES 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Directive Out of 
Scope             41    74.55%          43    74.14% 84 
Stated 
Reasons for 
Non-
enforcement 
Avoiding 
Retroactivity              6          10.91%           1  01.72% 7 
 Directive Not 
Yet Transposed             0    0.00%            4   06.90% 4 
 Directive Struck 
Down by ECJ             2   03.64%          0   0.00% 2 
 Procedural 
Impediments             6   10.91%          7   12.07% 13 
 Law of 
Transposition 
Not Yet 
Enforceable 
            0       0.00%           2   03.45% 2 
 Tacit 
Endorsement of 
National Law 
by EU Officials 
            0   0.00%            1   01.72% 1 
 Total 55 58   n =113 
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TABLE C1b: SOURCE OF REFERRALS TO ECJ 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Litigant 
Request 
            10    71.43%            4       33.33% 14 
Source 
Sua Sponte             4      28.57%            8    66.67% 12 
 Total 14 12   n = 26 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1b 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
10 4  
4 8 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.113   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    significance) 
 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1b 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.7143  Power (1-β) = 0.0554 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.6143  Actual α = 0.0300 
Populations 1 & 2 = (14, 12)   
  
 
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC) 
 - 43 - 
TABLE C1c: REFERRED REQUESTS AND DENIALS 
  
Court 
 
  Cassation Council of State Total 
Litigant 
Requests 
Granted            10    69.23%            4       33.33% 14 
 Denied             12      30.77%           13    66.67% 25 
 Total 22 17   n = 39 
FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1c 
 
Observed 
Frequencies 
Associated p value 
 
10 4  
12 13 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.193   >     0.05 
    (Level of statistical 
    significance) 
 
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1c 
 
Input Output 
Observed Proportion = 0.6923  Power (1-β) = 0.0735 
Theoretical Proportion = 0.5923  Actual α = 0.0348 
Populations 1 & 2 = (22, 17)   
  
 
